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We start with the ambition – dating back to the early days of the semantic web – of assembling a significant
portion human knowledge into a contradiction-free form using semantic web technology. We argue that
this would not be desirable, because there are concepts, known as essentially contested concepts, whose
definitions are contentious due to deep-seated ethical disagreements. Further, we argue that the ninetenth
century hermeneutical tradition has a great deal to say, both about the ambition, and about why it fails. We
conclude with some remarks about statistics.
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1. THE AMBITIONS OF THE SEMANTIC WEB
The Semantic Web has, from its inception, had
impressive ambitions: it was intended to be “a web
of machine-readable information whose meaning
is well-defined by standards”. (Berners-Lee 2005,
p. xi) What is ambitious in this statement is
the idea of defining meaning by standards: the
benefits of machine-readable information are not
contentious, and neither are the benefits of definition
by standards, but the idea that one could extend
these benefits to the realm of meaning is somewhat
more ambitious.
Berners-Lee was, of course, somewhat more
modest:
There will be information on the Web that has
a clearly defined meaning and can be analysed
and traced by computer programs: there will be
information, such as poetry and art, that requires the
whole human intellect for an understanding that will
always be subjective. (Berners-Lee 2005, p. xiii)
Despite this, he still has sizeable ambitions:
computers should be able to manage us
the exciting possibility of letting programs run over
[data about the projects we are engaged in] and help
us analyse and manage what we are doing. The
computer renders the scene visibly as a software
agent, doing anything it can to help us with the bulk
of data, to take over the tedium of anything that can
be reduced to a rational process, and to manage
the scale of our human systems. (Berners-Lee 2005,
p. xiv)
“We are forming cells within a global brain”, he
writes, “and we are excited that we might start to
think collectively”. (Berners-Lee 2005, p. xxiii)
There are two issues that arise here. The first is
whether the fulfilment of these ambitions would be
desirable: the second is whether it might be possible.
(Undesirable but impossible might not be a benign
state of affairs, because the effort to implement
this sort of thing might be still very damaging.) We
will examine the first issue in the remainder of this
section, and the second one in Sections 2 and 3.
First, some disclaimers. We are not arguing that
the Semantic Web is a bad thing: in the applica-
tions developed so far, such as those described
in the demos at http://iswc2010.semanticweb.org/
accepted-poster-demo, seem to be quite benign. We
are merely arguing against certain exaggerated am-
bitions. We are also not conducting a transcendental,
impossible-in-principle argument, perhaps along the
lines of Harnad (2003): on the contrary, our argument
will focus on the practicalities. It will be an argument
1
Semantics, Hermeneutics, Statistics
White
against the possibility, or desirability, of attaining
consensus algorithmically.
1.1. Essentially Contested Concepts
Essentially contested concepts (Gallie 1956) are
those “the proper use of which inevitably involves
endless disputes about their proper uses on the
part of their users”. These concepts are typically
evaluative or in some sense politically loaded: for
an example, see the discussion of power in Allen
(2008). These concepts are essentially contested
because any attempt to define them would involve
attaining, or imposing, consensus on political or
evaluative norms on which there is (and likely cannot
be) consensus: a typical case seems to be that of
a tradition in which the authenticity, or otherwise,
of temporal continuations of that tradition is always
under the possibility of re-evaluation.1
Suppose that we had an automatic processing
machine for extracting meaning from text corpora:
it would have, for example, text parsers, and then
there would be software to turn the parse trees
into some sort of semantic representation. So we
could automatically generate a lot of semantic
representations.
But that would not be enough, because we have to
resolve contradictions between these texts: we have
to say when terms in the semantic representation
co-refer, when different texts make contradictory
assertions about the same individuals, and so on:
and, when we find such contradictions, we have to
resolve them in some way. There seems to be some
expectation that statistics will help here: that, when
we can scan entire libraries (Foster 2011) and extract
semantics from them, we can use the brute power of
statistics to resolve contradictions.
I shall argue, in the remainder of this paper, that such
convergence is unlikely to help us: that statistics,
though it may be an indispensable tool in a number of
other ways, is unlikely to help us towards a consistent
global state of knowledge. There is, however, one
point which should be made now: that, if this did
work, we would not have any essentially contested
concepts left, and we would have arrived at that
state without discussion and without any conscious,
rational resolution of the issues which make these
concepts essentially contested. One could, perhaps,
imagine how those who represented the losing side
might feel: that, perhaps, this scanning of entire
libraries had merely expressed the majority view,
and that being the majority view did not make it
right; or, perhaps, that this process of scanning entire
1Compare MacIntyre (1988, p. 12): “A tradition is an argument
extended through time in which certain fundamental agreements
are defined and redefined.”
libraries followed by statistical resolution did not have
the sort of reflective, deliberative capabilities which
any serious attempt to resolve these issues should
appeal to. One need not be a Luddite to feel a good
deal of sympathy with these positions.
2. HERMENEUTICS
These are questions which have a long history. In
particular, there is a long tradition of reflection on the
process of interpretation of texts, on the problems
of using texts which originated in a thought world
radically different from our own, of deciphering texts
which may use an obscure vocabulary, of reconciling
contradictions between or within texts. There had
been reflection on these matters since the ancient
world, but it was particularly in the modern era (from
Spinoza onwards) that this subject flourished, and,
particularly, acquired a name: it has, since the mid
eighteenth century, been known as hermeneutics
(Ramberg and Gjesdal 2009).
We will summarise an argument from Schleierma-
cher’s Hermeneutics (1977):2 it is an argument that
the process of interpretation of a text may well not
terminate, even if one has a great deal of information
about the context the text was written in. In this
respect it is analogous to modern arguments for
the indeterminacy of translation such as Quine’s
(1969). However, it is probably more interesting (and
certainly more realistic): Schleiermacher, as well as
being a philosopher and theologian (Frank 1977;
Forster 2008; Marin˜a 2005), also did a great deal of
translation (he was responsible for most of what was,
for a very long time, the standard German translation
of Plato). So in this respect he was talking about
something that he knew well from the practical point
of view, and this is a comparative rarity in discussions
of this sort.
There are two methodological decisions that
Schleiermacher makes. Firstly, he argues that
[t]he meaning of any word in any given place must be
determined according to its relationship with those
words which surround it. (Schleiermacher 1977,
p. 116), (1998, p. 44)
Words are ambiguous (a fact which was obvious
to Schleiermacher and which has been made
obvious again by bitter experience of computational
linguistics): so, in practice, their senses are
determined by the constraints placed on them by
their grammatical and semantic relations with other
words in their neighbourhood. These relations can
2I shall use my own translations of (Schleiermacher 1977): the
English translation (Schleiermacher 1998) is over-literal and quite
hard to understand.
2
Semantics, Hermeneutics, Statistics
White
extend quite far – for example, if a noun is a subject
of a series of verbs (a series which, because of
anaphora, can extend beyond the boundaries of
a single sentence), then the constraints on that
noun come from all of the verbs, and, reciprocally,
the verbs constrain each other because of the
requirement to have a common subject. So, as
Schleiermacher remarks, in order to apply this
criterion, one must draw a boundary (1977, p. 135)
(1998, p. 61), and it is far from obvious where this
boundary goes.
In this context, Schleiermacher introduces a distinc-
tion between what he calls primary and secondary
thoughts: primary thoughts (Hauptgedanken) are
those which are said for their own sake, secondary
thoughts (Nebengedanken) those which there be-
cause they serve to articulate the primary thoughts
(Schleiermacher 1977, p. 133) (1998, pp. 59f.). This
distinction is important, because the criterion above
only strictly applies to primary thoughts: commu-
nicating those is the author’s main project, and it
is that project which leads to the desire for con-
sistency and so the mutual constraints. (Schleier-
macher 1977, p. 136) (1998, p. 62) This leads to
several reasons why particular phrases may not yield
relevant constraints. For example, an author may
use contradictory assertions in order to illuminate
their main argument: as Schleiermacher remarks,
“Such contradictions often bring about a definite
interpretation more effectively than analogies, be-
cause a contradiction is far more striking than either
an analogy or simply a distinction”. (1977, p. 137)
(1998, p. 63) So one has to be able to recognise
when these contradictions occur (because otherwise
the constraints one produces will be very strange
indeed). This may, of course, not be easy.
In a similar way an author can introduce a
digression, or some sort of parenthetic insertion.
(Schleiermacher 1977, p. 141) (1998, p. 66)
These interrupt the series of primary thoughts
(and, consequently, the construction of semantic
constraints) but they do not end it. After the end
of the parenthesis, one resumes the constraints.
However, beginnings and ends of parentheses may
not be marked by explicit punctuation (punctuation
is generally very rare in ancient texts), and so one
might not actually know whether the context has
ended or not: the series of primary thoughts may just
end, and one may read on, and then suddenly it may
begin again. (Schleiermacher 1977, p. 141) (1998,
p. 66) So here again we have a situation in which
recognising the boundary of the context is not easy.
Difficulties are compounded if one wants (as one
frequently does) to extend the context to parallel
locations in other texts: the text that you have in
front of you may simply not give enough information
to determine its own meaning. And there is also
a theoretical reason why we may want to do this:
in general, no utterance can be understood without
taking into account its relation, on the one hand, to
the thought of the person who produced it, and, on
the other hand, to the totality of the language that
it belongs to (Schleiermacher 1977, p. 77) (1998,
p. 8). And so we again require judgement in order
to determine the extent of the relevant context.
(Schleiermacher 1977, p. 137) (1998, p. 63)
Now these distinctions are not only rather subtle
and not obviously algorithmic, but they are also
circular: each one of them depends on some sort
of understanding of the texts that you are applying
it to. Schleiermacher was, of course, conscious of
this, and does say that, before you start any serious
interpretation, you should get an overview of the
text in question by reading it through (1977, p. 134)
(1998, p. 61). And it is for these reasons that he
says that the task of hermeneutics is infinite, only to
be achieved by approximation (1977, p. 168) (1998,
p. 91). This is not, I think, merely an rhetorical
gesture for him: as he writes,
One should check the semantic value of all elements
of the sentence [in question] and not only the one
which one has run up against, since it can often
happen that we run up against one because of
ignorance of others. Of course, this has an exception
if, because of earlier usage and practice on other
texts in the language one has attained certainty that
only this one element is unknown to one. But one
should carefully test oneself on this, so as not to
end up in confusion which could easily have been
avoided by working more exactly. (Schleiermacher
1977, pp. 134f.) (1998, p. 61)
So we have our argument: because of the circular
nature of the interpretation process, and because of
the difficulty of some of the judgements we have to
make while performing it, we have no guarantee that
the process may terminate, or, that if it does, it will
always terminate with the same result.
2.1. Politics
How does this fit with the example we started with,
that of essentially contested concepts? Consider
one of these – maybe, for example, a definition of
power – and consider a scholar writing a polemic
against one of the meanings, arguing, let us say,
that power should be seen as a resource rather
than as a relation of domination. This scholar may,
for example, outline her own conception as well as
quoting, or even simply parodying, her opponent’s
conception; may break off the argument to develop a
narrative illustration, and then resume the argument;
may state opponent’s views in the middle of her
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text; may simply refer to technical terms without
explanation, in such a way that the reader is taken
to know the literature in which these terms are
introduced and explained. Consider the task of a
future scholar trying to interpret this text: they would
face all of the difficulties which Schleiermacher
describes, and it is not obvious how, removed from
the context in which the polemic was written and
which gives it its meaning, these difficulties could be
easily solved. So these problems are very real.
3. STATISTICS
So how would a supposed library-scanning machine
deal with the example of the polemical scholar?
What could statistical methods tell us? To an
extent this depends on the methods used: standard
methods which apply to entire documents could
not really disentangle the two competing meanings,
simply because, to distinguish them, they would
have to look at contexts smaller than entire
documents. So, one would think, a successful
statistical technique would have to filter out the
polemicist’s argument from her opponent’s: but the
use of parody seems to show that any suitable
criterion could be spoofed by a suitably faithful
parody.
To an extent, these are problems which both
hermeneutics and statistical methods suffer from,
although the hermeneutic tradition is, I would argue,
more conscious of the difficulties. Consider the case
of a scholar with revolutionary insights, expressed
either in a new terminology or in old terminology
expressed in new ways; this is a case which
Schleiermacher analyses (1977, pp. 139f.) (1998,
p. 65). At the time where the new concepts are
introduced, or the old concepts subverted, there
will be no relevant context of other documents
from which to establish the meaning (either
hermeneutically or statistically). And so the result
will be either that the texts cannot be understood
in their period, or that they have alien meanings
imposed on them. This is, again, a real difficulty:
there is a large historical literature on the medieval
precursors of Galileo, but these medieval thinkers
remain, despite the best efforts of good scholars,
very difficult to interpret, more or less for the reasons
that Schleiermacher describes. It would be hard to
imagine statistics doing any better.
There are two things to be said in summing up. One
is positive: statistical methods do seem very capable
of performing certain things – of detecting gross
similarities between documents, for example, or of
doing effective search for queries of certain sorts.
But they do this at a certain cost: that of neglecting
certain sorts of data.
Let us start with an example, one which was very
familiar to Schleiermacher. The New Testament can
be considered as a corpus, and quite a small corpus
at that: it has 140315 words (word tokens, that is).
These words are instances of 19886 word type: of
these type, 11,588 (that is, over half) occur only
once (they are what are called hapax legomena).
So we only have these words in single contexts, if
we look solely at the New Testament: in practice we
can get enough information about them by looking
at etymology and other Greek documents from the
same period and milieu. In part, this statistic is
easy to explain: the New Testament is, after all, a
comparatively small sample.
But if we go up to a larger sample – we can
construct a larger corpus of 2247850 words from
Greek literature roughly of the period – we find
that it still has a non-negligible number of hapax
legomena: 9851, to be precise. The number has
decreased, but really not very much in proportion
to the increase in size of the corpus (which has
become over two orders of magnitude larger).
Furthermore, 68 of the hapax legomena in the New
Testament are still hapax legomena in the larger
corpus. This is because the distribution of word
frequencies in text has what is called a scale-free
distribution: however many individuals one samples,
the distribution of frequencies in the sample always
looks very much the same, hapax legomena and all.
Statistical approaches to language usually deal with
this difficulty as follows:
In practical systems, it is usual to not actually
calculate n-gram models for all words. Rather, the
n-grams are calculated as usual only for the most
common k words, and all other words are regarded
as Out-Of-Vocabulary items . . . Commonly, this will
be done for all words that have been encountered
only once in the training corpus (hapax legomena).
(Manning and Schu¨tze 2003, p. 199)
This approach is, as I have said, successful for
a lot of things. But it amounts to a deliberate
neglect of rare words, and there are circumstances
in which one might not want to do that. Consider
the example of revolutionary terminology: this may
well, statistically considered, be quite rare at its
inception. But it may well be significant : significant,
that is, in the human, ethical sense, rather than
in the statistical sense. And this refers us back to
the argument at the beginning: how do we know
that the users of such a minority vocabulary might
be comfortable with being swamped in statistical
averages of word types? And, on a suitably weighted
average, they will be swamped: we cannot assume
that, if we have a minority vocabulary in a particular
sample, it will automatically be found again in
a larger sample. The corpus statistics that we
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have seen do not support that assumption. The
New Testament, of course, is something of an
exception here: we have a minority vocabulary
which went on to become mainstream (and, if
I were to include, in my larger Greek corpus,
much later literature, in particular commentaries
on the New Testament, then the hapax legomean
would disappear, because they would, of course,
all be quoted in the commentaries). But most
minority vocabularies, one would hypothesise, are
not like that: they correspond to social or intellectual
practices that briefly flourished and then died out.
This is probably the typical case: this is what a scale-
free distribution of phenomena like this gives you.
4. EVALUATION
This is a rather technical argument, quoting freely
from philosophy and statistics, and using historical
examples that came to hand. What lessons can we
draw from it?
Consensus and Politics Many of the tools of
which Berners-Lee describes as computers
“render[ing] the scene visibly as a software
agent, doing anything it can to help us
with the bulk of data, . . . tak[ing] over the
tedium of anything that can be reduced to a
rational process, . . . manag[ing] the scale of
our human systems” can, in some contexts, be
redescribed as the imposition of a consensus.
There are politically loaded contexts in which
such processes carry a considerable political
weight: one should be aware, despite the shiny
optimistic vocabulary, of just what the dangers
are.
Statistics and Complexity In many of these cases
the statistics does not support what one tries to
do with it: the data can be irreducibly complex
and can resist summarisation. Traditional
statistical methods rely on the absence of
long-range correlations, which are pervasive in
data like this. If the methods don’t work, they
don’t work, but they still give you numbers.
In a culture like ours, where numbers are
simultaneously revered and avoided, this is
extremely dangerous.
Humanism The sort of intellectual landscape that
I have been describing is pervasive in the
culture of humanism: the engagement with
texts and the circumstances in which they were
produced, the distrust of averages, the caution
about the automatic assumption of superiority.
It is worth talking to these people.
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